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INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE 
Allan Macartney 
The current slogan of the Scottish National Party (SNP) -
"SCOTLAND'S FUTURE: INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE" has been 
arguably one of the most successful in post -war political history, certainly 
one of the three best slogans the SNP has produced. (I) It has apparently 
received much support from the public and has naturally been attacked by 
the Party's opponents and by dissident nationalists alike. The attacks have 
tended to allege that it is "meaningless", "just a slogan", "dangerously 
misleading" or (from dissidents) a terrible mistake or betrayal. It is also 
frequently alleged that in adopting this campaigning slogan the Party did an 
abrupt, dramatic U-turn, at the Inverness Annual National Conference in 
September 1988. In this article all ofthese aspects will be considered, as will 
the question of whether the Independence-in-Europe position entails a 
retreat into (or confident reassertion of) fundamentalism or whether on the 
contrary it opens up prospects of greater success for the national 
movement, and wider support for the SNP, than heretofore. Indeed the 
fascination of the slogan arises from its ramifications: for the Party; for the 
future development of Europe; and- by no means least- for the current 
debate about Scotland's constitution, which, as McCrone says, is intense 
and vibrant.(2) 
Popular Appeal 
Opinion Polls have revealed a substantial body of support for Scottish 
Independence-in-Europe, although care must be taken in their 
interpretation. In answer to the broad question of whether, after 1992, 
Scotland's interests would be better served if Scotland were an independent 
country within the European Community (EC), a majority of respondents 
(54%) said that they would be better served (System III poll). In a MORI 
poll (February 1989) 24% of people supported the option of "an 
independent Scotland which is separate from England and Wales but part 
of the EC" and a further 11% preferred the option of "an independent 
Scotland which is separate from both England and Wales and the EC''m. 
Before looking at this support for Independence-in-Europe in more detail, 
it is worth setting it in the context of two other factors. 
The first of these is the sens_e of nationality. As Moreno points out<4), 
the sense of an exclusive Scottish nationality at 39% is far higher than 
exclusively Catalan national sentiment. The exclusively Scottish national 
feeling revealed in the 1986 poll compares with 54% of respondents who see 
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themselves as having a dual nationality (both Scottish and British), what 
the late John P Mackintosh used to describe as the key to understanding 
Scottish attitudes to constitutional change. This ties in with the point made 
recently by McLean that: "in the 80s ... , despite the SNP being 
marginalised for the first part of the decade, and despite the issue of 
Independence being equally off the agenda in terms of scarcely being 
discussed in any way by the media until recently, the Scottish people of their 
own accord started making a very fundamental shift in their attitudes which 
reflected a far more deep-seated growing divide between Scotland and 
England"<5l. 
What is intriguing is that support for an independent Scotland within 
the EC is so much higher than support for Independence simpliciter. Miller 
has recently documented this very usefully.<6l In a poll commissioned by 
Scottish Television, when people were asked whether they wished to retain 
the Union with England, a majority wanted to retain the Union with 
England. But, when the same people were asked whether they would like 
an independent Scotland within Europe, there was a majority for that 
option also. From these figures, 28% were Unionists who wanted Scotland 
to remain in the Union with England and also wanted the UK to represt;nt 
them in Europe; 34% were Nationalists who wanted to end the Union with 
England and wanted direct Scottish representation in Europe; but 26% 
wanted both options, i.e. to keep the Union with England but have direct 
Scottish representation in Europe. The latter group have thus not adopted 
a consistent nationalist position and perhaps the best label to apply to them 
would be a borrowed term from Spanish, independentistas, or, less 
appealingly, "Euro-Nats". I would argue that this sizeable chunk of voters 
is pivotal for the future direction of Scotland's constitutional position. 
So how is one to account for the apparent popularity of Independence-
in-Europe? It is implausible to argue that such a sizeable number are in 
favour of something they do not understand. They must understand 
something, and something attractive, in the idea of Independence-in-
Europe. In the absence of survey data it must be a matter for surmise, but 
clearly one strand is a recognition of the growing importance ofthe EC, and 
an acceptance of the Common Market (as it is still commonly termed), 
dating back to the referendum of 1975 when Scotland said Yes. Moreover 
the idea of direct Scottish representation, via a Scottish government, in 
Brussels had majority support four years after that referendum.<7> 
The other strand must refer to the desire for Scottish democracy: i.e. 
that the will of the majority of voters should be reflected in government 
policy (and personnel). The imposition of the poll tax on Scotland alone, 
despite its explicit and dramatic rejection in the 1987 General Election, is 
but the clearest example of the violation of this Scottish democratic 
principle. 
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It may well be that this line of reasoning accounts for the rise in support 
for Independence per se but it does not explain the additional suport for 
Independence-in-Europe. Is it just the case that the 26% alread~ 
mentioned, as Professor Miller says, "want to have their cake and eat it"?< l 
Or is there something which observers are missing? By far the most likely 
explanation is connected with the dawning realisation of 1992 and the 
Single European Market: in other words the realisation that an 
independent Scotland in Europe could not possibly entail isolationism, let 
alone the old-fashioned scaremongering of an English trade war, sealed 
borders, scorched earth policies or even that old bogey, customs posts and 
mile-long queues of cars at Berwick. Another way of putting this is that the 
tag of "separatism", which was once so effective in scaring people off voting 
SNP, can no longer be applied. <9l There may be another factor: the 
perception of Scotland as a European nation, not just by those in 
professions such as the law but by a mass of Scots who have first-hand 
experience of the Continent and by others who see nothing incongruous in 
Scotland's being pitted against Denmark or Portugal on big sporting 
occasions such as the World Cup or European Cup. It can only be 
conjecture in the absence of any comparative data, but it is a fair bet that 
there has been a shift of interest this century from the British Empire via the 
Commonwealth to Europe. That this trend- encouraged by Brussels- will 
accelerate there seems little doubt. 
Meaning of "Independence-in-Europe" 
It is obvious that Scotland forms part of Europe, that Scots are 
Europeans just as much as are Icelanders, Sardinians, Latvians, Austrians 
and Germans. And Maxwell is right to protest at "the vulgar identification 
of 'Europe' with the European Community. "(JOl So in that sense it is 
obvious that an independent Scotland would always be as much part of 
Europe as- dare one say?- Albania. But there is the rub. Albania may 
have had a bad press, but the fact remains that for a stubborn majority of 
Scots "Albanian" status has little appeal, whereas "Danish" status appears 
very attractive. Now, most Scots may know little of Albania but they can 
identify with Denmark; and not only would see nothing outrageous in 
aspiring to such status but are impressed with the strength of the free trade 
area which will be in place by 1992. As Gordon Wilson has put it, "Scotland 
cannot afford to be left in the cold". (II) 
The other key word clearly is "independence". Danish, or for that 
matter Irish (or in future Austrian) status is a shorthand, but it is hardly 
lacking in clarity. The independent Scotland proposed by the SNP would be 
a member of the United Nations and all its agencies, like the above-
mentioned-countries; would be a.constitutional monarchy like Denmark; 
and would be a non-nuclear country like the Irish Republic and Austria. 
Like Canada and New Zealand we would share a monarchy with the 
English. In addition to membership of international organisations- which 
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provides excellent opportunities for making a direct contribution on issues 
involving the whole of the human race - Scotland could set up legations 
where they were most useful. A glance at the membership of the consular 
corps in Edinburgh and Glasgow (not to mention Lerwick and Aberdeen) 
will indicate the countries which already see it as useful to have direct 
representation here, and one would assume reciprocity on our part as the 
first step. One last point has occasionally been raised as a problem: the 
delimitation of the Anglo-Scottish Border in the North Sea and the 
consequent control of the off-shore gas and oil fields. Fortunately there is 
now such a body of expertise and so many precendents in international law 
that this should not create any novel, let alone any insoluble, problems. But 
it may be worth mentioning the SNP's longstanding policy of an 
Association of States of the British Isles (ASBI), modelled on the Nordic 
Council, which would have a permanent commission and regular meetings 
on the many matters of common interest such as the railways, and posts and 
communications generally. 
It may be objected that simply defining "independence" and "Europe" 
as above misses the point of the special relationship which follows as a 
consequence of membership of the EC. The most fervent anti-Marketecrs 
argue that independence and EC membership are mutually 
incompatible:(l 2l that so much sovereignty has been lost by London, Bonn 
and Lisbon that these are no longer the capitals of independent states. 
Others, like Maxwell, argue more cogently that there is a "basic 
contradiction in (the) SNP's position on the European community. The 
SNP is tryinS at one and the same time to be Integrationist and 
Nationalist. "(1 l Now, this raises the important question of the future 
direction the EC will take. But if it is a problem for a future government in 
Edinburgh, then the dilemma is equally applicable to Rome, Copenhagen 
and Paris. 
Fortunately while there is an on-going debate about the future 
development of the EC, the existing position is set out in explicit detail. No 
one can seriously allege that the institutions of the EC are obscure and 
unknown: despite appearances of Byzantine complexity in the decision-
making processes of Brussels, we are not talking about joining the Ottoman 
Empire. Disregard the rhetoric of the Monets, the Dooges and the Spin ellis 
so often quoted by Euro-fanatics and their equally determined opponents. 
Every step taken, from the days of the European Coal and Steel 
Community onwards, including The Treaty of Rome and the Single 
European Act,<14l was fought over and agreed on line by line. The 
implications for Scotland are all spelled out concisely and .clearly in the 
Sillars booklet produced early in 1989.<15) 
Thus the dissolution of the Anglo-Scottish Union and the consequent 
readjustment of membership would mean essentially a seat at the "top 
table" (i.e. the Council of Ministers) for Scotland. The Luxembourg 
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Compromise or Accord means that the (rarely used) veto remains and the 
legal veto (on amendments to the Treaties) remains absolutely. But in 
matters concerning the completion of the Single European Market (SEM), 
where qualified majority voting may be invoked, then Scotland would 
command three votes (as with Denmark). The rotation of the Presidency-
which would bring the Council of Ministers to Edinburgh regularly - is 
provided for.· Similarly there would always be a Scottish Commissioner. 
Likewise there would always be a Scottish Judge on the European Court. 
Scotland's Foreign Minister would participate in the increasingly influential 
European Political Co-operation (EPC) mechanism. And finally Scotland 
would double the number of Members elected to the European Parliament. 
So, in sum, the change in Scotland's legal constitutional and political 
status involved in Independence-in-Europe, far from being "just a slogan", 
is exceptionally well defined. Less clear are the economic consequences of 
the SEM and of future developments, not least in the financial and 
monetary fields, and these deserve full discussion in their own right. (t 6) 
Obstacles 
In the objections to Independence-in-Europe three arguments 
predominate. These relate to: (a) England's ability to veto Scottish 
membership of the Community: (b) Continentals' fear of upsetting the 
apple cart; and (c) the possibility of economic sanctions against Scotland. 
All deserve the most careful consideration possible. It is my conviction 
however that the more the arguments are explored the less force the 
objections will be seen to have. 
It is important to note that, when it is asserted that England could 
block Scottish membership of the EC, it is couched in these terms: "You 
can have Independence if you want it, but don't count on an automatic or 
easy passage when you apply to join the EC". This is not the same as the 
celebrated Archie Birt question, "What happens when England says 'no'?'' 
That fundamental question has to be separately addressed. Would London 
deal with a democratic vote for Independence by simple use of the 
Parliamentary steamroller? Would Westminster be deaf to appeals based 
on the right of self-determination of all peoples which (as Article 1 (1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966)<17l it itself, in 
common with all the other EC parliaments, has ratified? Or would an 
initially intransigent Whitehall's arm be twisted by other EC member 
states? The answer is interlinked with the matters discussed below 
concerning the nature of the new Europe we are in the course of building. 
That is not, however, the .way in which the objection is usually 
phrased. Rather the dilemma is posed for Scots: "if you opt for 
Independence you may spend years (perhaps spreading into decades) 
outside the EC in the queue behind Austria, Norway, Turkey, Cyprus and 
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Malta, waiting to see if Brussels would say 'yes"'. Meantime economic 
disruption, chaos and depression would be inevitable. Furthermore- and 
this is the key argument- the legal unanimity rule would hand the United 
Kingdom a veto, which she would not hesitate to use even if no other 
Member States did. This is the argumenr deployed by Baroness Elles, then 
Conservative MEP for the Thames Valley, in television and radio 
programmes in early 1989. That she was then Convener of the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the Parliament lent an apparent authority to her views, which 
were shared by Labour MEPs from both Scotland and England. 
Central to this argument was the view that the Anglo-Scottish Treaty 
of Union of 1707, which created the United Kingdom in the first place, was 
of no importance: that the Kingdom of England (which incorporates the 
Principality of Wales), with or without part oflreland, would simply occupy 
the UK seat, hoping that the change of sub-title (and change of flag) would 
not register with other Member States. Also central to the proposition was 
the idea that Westminster would, by excising Scotland from the UK, 
automatically and unilaterally expel the territory of Scotland (one-third of 
the land mass of Great Britain) from the EC, then use the veto to keep the 
Scots out. 
This scenario seems to me to be most implausible. There is at least the 
possibility that the other Member States would incline to the SNP view that 
-as with the amicable dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union- the 
ending of the Anglo-Scottish Union would leave two successor states, 
respecting their inherited treaty obligations and both keen to be "good 
Europeans", each entitled to negotiate a new arrangement with the EC to 
accommodate the new situation. Such at any rate was the view of Professor 
Emile Noel (President of the European University in Florence and former 
Secretary-General in the European Commission for 20 years until his 
retirement in 1987), who stated: 
"There is no precedent or provision for the expulsion of a member state, 
therefore Scottish independence would create two member states out of 
one .... They would have equal status with each other and the other 
eleven states. The remainder of the UK would not be in a more powerful 
position than Scotland". (IS) 
If Noel is right, and England would not be in a position to use the veto, 
then the question is whether the other member states would prevent 
Scotland (and England) from separate participant membership of the EC. 
This could be done by a majority of the European Parliam.ent, or by the 
government of any Member State. How likely is the application of such a 
veto? As regards the loss or expulsion of people and territory from the EC, 
it would certainly run completely counter to the preferred view in Brussels 
of an inexorably expanding Community. It would also run counter to the 
experience of the Greenlanders who had to negotiate for several long years 
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before they were allowed to leave (and, while they negotiated, the free 
trade arrangements remained intact). 
It has however been argued that the real fear would be that a Scottish 
precedent would be seen as opening the floodgates - that all de 
Rougemont's "submerged nations"<19l would demand the same, thus 
creating the nightmare of "!'Europe des cent drapeaux". For what it is 
worth, my view is that only the Basques are likely in the foreseable future to 
wish "Scottish" status. But calculations will have to be made in such 
circumstances as to what will best serve the interests of an EC which has 
always prided itself on its democratic basis. (ZO) 
The last obstacle raised in debate is that international capital, but more 
particularly British firms with headquarters in England, would pull out of 
Scotland, thereby creating dislocation and mass unemployment. This 
assertion is odd because it presupposes that firms act out of political 
motives (loyalty to London) against their own best (economic) interests. 
That oil companies in particular would desert the Scottish sector of the 
North Sea does seem unlikely. Of course, a lot would depend on the 
policies pursued by a Scottish government, which would be well aware of 
the views of large companies, particularly in matters of taxation. But if 
taxation were in fact reduced in Scotland, and the currency were prudently 
managed and aligned, then it is hard to see the prima facie reasoning behind 
this obstacle. 
Origins of "Independence-in-Europe" Campaign 
The formal adoption by the SNP of the slogan "Scotland's Future -
INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE" for the 1988 Annual National 
Conference was undertaken at a Senior Officer Bearers meeting<ZI) earlier 
that year and homologated by a massive majority of the Conference 
delegates meeting in Inverness. As Jim Sillars has said, (Z2) that conference 
resolution embodied the clarion call which removed any remaining doubt 
about the Party's position vis-a-vis the EC- and this despite the fact that the 
commitment to holding a national referendum on membership (on the 
terms negotiated by a putative future Scottish government) remains Party 
policy, which could theoretically lead to a decision by the Scottish 
electorate to pull out of the EC. 
There remains therefore an enigmatic aspect to all of this: has the SNP 
done an abrupt U-turn on the issue, or did Inverness mark nothing more 
than a further stage in the development of Party policy? And, while that 
change (abrupt or gradual) was taking place within the SNP, was the rest of 
the nation ignoring the whole question? 
There are a few recorded instances of discussion of Scotland's future 
relationship with the EC before the 1975 referendum campaign. Billy 
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Wolfe's semi-autobiographical book Scotland Lives makes reference to the 
issue<23l in 1973. The Kilbrandon Report, published the same year, has 
some discussion of the impact of the EEC on prospective devolved 
assemblies and devotes several paragraphs to a discussion of the "effects of 
UK entry to the EEC on separatism". 
491. The effects of Community membership on the separatist case 
generally are not such as to alter the main conclusions reached in this 
chapter. The potential viability of Scotland and Wales as independent 
states depends essentially on the political will of their own peoples, and 
is therefore not crucially affected. 
492. The effects of membership on the economic arguments for 
separatism can only be guessed at. If Scotland and Wales were to leave 
the Community on becoming independent, a customs barrier would go 
up between them and England. They would be denied free access not 
only to the English market but to the whole of the Community market. 
On the periphery of Europe, and with their industry still in need of 
reconstruction, it seems most unlikely that they could on their own 
revitalise their economies and compete successfully with their 
neighbours. Certainly their prospects in that situation are not such as to 
enhance the case for separation from England. 
493. If on becoming independent Scotland and Wales were to be 
accepted as members of the European Economic Community in their 
own right, there would be no customs barrier with England. 
Membership of the Community by England, Scotland and Wales would 
in itself require a customs union between them. But the economic 
prospects of Scotland and Wales would not obviously be better than they 
would be if they remained within the Community as parts of the United 
Kingdom. Admittedly they would be separately represented in Brussels 
and would be able to press their own case. But within the United 
Kingdom they could benefit to the maximum from both United 
Kingdom and Community regional policies; they could be treated in 
their entirety as assisted areas; they could expect to receive special 
United Kingdom funds for industrial development, and to benefit from 
restrictions on industrial development in other parts of Britain; and they 
could be accepted in Brussels as parts of a member state deserving 
special financial help. If they were outside the United Kingdom they 
would lose the benefit of United Kingdom regional policies, including 
the diversion of industrial development from England, and might have 
difficulty in persuading the Community that their who!e territories 
should be regarded as areas qualifying for special assistance. As small 
and relatively inaccessible markets they would be offering little in the 
way of economic advantage to the Community, but would be in need of 
the maximum help from it. 
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494. Our general conclusion is that, while the United Kingdom's entry 
into Europe does not rule out the separation of Scotland and Wales, it 
does not make it any more attractive; in particular, it might add to the 
already considerable economic difficulties which would face Scotland 
and Wales as independent states.<24l 
Jim Sillars had alluded to the case for Scottish independence within the 
EEC in Parliament<25l in 1972 and followed this up with a pamphlet in 1975 
in the immediate aftermath of the 1975 referendum.<26l 
It was in fact the unexpected affirmative vote for continued UK 
membership of the EC which led many in both the SNP and the Labour 
Party in Scotland to rethink their position. The two parties between them 
were unable to "deliver" a vote against EC membership. Respect for the 
democratic process and the solemn weight of the referendum decision 
moved many Nationalists towards a turning round of the 1975 campaign 
slogan ("NO VOICE, NO ENTRY"). They felt that the negative should be 
turned into a positive affirmation that Scotland should have her own direct 
say in the EC as a Member State, always provided that this, and the terms of 
the membership, were duly endorsed by a referendum. In 1975, the pro-EC 
faction (in greater or lesser degree vocal) included Professor Neil 
MacCormick, George Reid, MP and others with broadly liberal sympathies 
such as Murray Normand of Mull. To them was added the influential weight 
of Winnie Ewing, MEP, who convinced her Party that Strasbourg was far 
more sympathetic to Scotland than was Westminster. The political passage 
of Jim Sillars<27l from Labour through the independentista Scottish Labour 
Party<28l to the SNP brought powerful additional reinforcements, this time 
explicitly from the Left. 
At any rate the proportion of SNP members prepared to accept the EC 
as a fact of life, and argue for Independence within the Community, ~rew 
steadily from 1975 to the 1984 conference. As Mitchell documents,<2 the 
coalition of leading members identified with different tendencies within the 
Party was sufficient to produce an 80% Yes vote at Inverness in 1988. What 
the 1988 Conference did was finally endorse the change of emphasis- and 
launch Independence-in-Europe as the Party's flagship policy and its slogan 
for the Euro-elections of 1989. 
Neo-Fundamentalism or Revisionism? 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the SNP's newly launched 
flagship has been assailed from opposite directions. On the one hand many 
non-Nationalists, particularly those in sympathy with the Constitutional 
Convention project, are accusing the SNP of a revived fundamentalism: 
"the surge in SNP support persuaded many that the fundamentalist position 
of 'Independence, Nothing Less' lay behind it.. .. The decision-making 
councils of the SNP voted not to enter the Convention, but to rally under its 
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new-found slogan of 'Independence in Europe"'<30l 
On the other hand there are a number of nationalists (some of whom 
have left the SNP to join the Scottish Socialist Party or in one case 
threatened to field a Scottish Sovereignty candidate in the Highlands and 
Islands) who are bitter at what they regard as a sell-out of the Party's 
principles. They are convinced that the compromise on sovereignty 
inevitably entailed by adherence to the EC Treaties is a betrayal of a true 
Nationalist ideology. 
My belief is that neither position does justice as an explanation of the 
SNP's current mood and position. What the SNP has at the time of writing is 
a feeling of buoyancy at being the second party in Scotland (in terms of 
votes cast and opinion poll figures), coupled with a new confidence that it 
has found the right slogan with which to rally support. This feeling unites 
the broad mass of the Party, although there are convinced gradualists, and 
equally convinced "Albanians", who are not in agreement with the Party 
line. 
The Party's line on gradualism versus fundamentalism has, as Mitchell 
explains<31 l, been resolved by recourse to the device of a directly elected 
constituent assembly (constitutional convention), and/or to a referendum 
on Independence. The real split over the CSA type of convention was 
whether to accept such a non-elected body (with an overall Labour 
majority to boot) or whether to hold out for a convention, and/or multi-
option referendum, in line with existing Party policy. 
Key to Unlock Wide Support? 
The appeal of Independence-in-Europe in opinion polls has been 
stated above. Yet in the recent European elections, despite a significant 
swing towards the SNP and Greens, only 26% voted SNP (and another 7% 
voted for the Scottish Green Party with the policy of Independence outwith 
the EC). The "devolution" parties (Labour and SSLD) got just under half 
the votes and the pro-status-quo Conservatives one-fifth. All of which 
produces a result, on the face of it, close to the average preferred 
constitutional options produced when the conventional questions are asked 
in opinion polls;02l it does not apparently reflect any mass shift in voting 
pattern away from Labour to the SNP. Nevertheless there is every reason to 
put one's faith in the "idea whose time has come". The important factor is 
not only the size of the independentista cohort in the population (i.e. those 
who believe in Independence-in-Europe) but its appeal .to leaders of 
Scottish opinion. John Pollock, former Chairman of the Labour Party in 
Scotland and former General Secretary of the Educational Institute of 
Scotland, is one such example. <33) The Chartered Accountants who voted 
against a merger with the English CAs are likewise independentistas- and 
will surely set about forging links of a confederal nature with their 
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counterparts in other European nations. The same must likewise be on the 
cards for other professional bodies, for the churches, the STUC, trades 
unions and sporting bodies etc which are not part of a UK organisation: 
their future lies with Europe, through direct Scottish participation. 
Even tht; business community, while it may oppose devolution 
(particularly with an unreformed electoral system) on the grounds that it 
would impose heavy additional taxes on private enterprise, ought to be able 
to see that the position is likely to be different with Independence-in-
Europe, while 1992 makes all of the EC into one single market anyway. 
How would the lobbying activities of the Scottish Fishermen's Federation 
and the National Farmers Union best be carried out- via Edinburgh or via 
London? The question is virtually rhetorical. 
The Future of Europe 
There are so many visions of Europe, so many models and so many 
labels- most of them more familiar in French, the working language of the 
EC. There is also ample scope for confusion when apparently common 
terms like "region" or "province" or "nation" are applied differently in 
different languages and different contexts- an example being "federalisme 
integral", which is best translated into English not as "integral federalism" 
(which sounds very centralist) but as "maximum devolution". 
Nevertheless aspirations for the future of the EC can be broken down 
along several lines. First there is the question of centralisation versus 
decentralisation. Within the centralist camp there are those who seek ever 
closer unification of Europe, with the eventual aim of having a single state 
with control of external policy and defence, and a single currency. This 
would mean one seat at the United Nations instead of the current twelve. 
There would be one EC diplomatic corps, one army, navy and air force, and 
probably one working language (French, English or Esperanto). The 
model usually implied by this is the United States of America or possibly 
Canada. Against this ambition stand those who believe in states rights, who 
prefer a confederal solution. In such a confederation there would be 
conferred upon the central government only such powers as the member 
states agreed to transfer. That is the position of the SNP and it is not 
dissimilar to the current EC. 
The next question, overlapping with the first, concerns identity. The 
integrationists want people to feel European first and foremost, albeit 
recognising the cultural complexities which exist. The patriots (or cultural 
nationalists) who resist the Euro-fanatics see the diversity of Europe's 
nations as lying at the core of being European. In particular they hate the 
thought of a Western Europe which became, through a melting pot process, 
a transatlantic version of the USA. Clearly the SNP are aligned with the 
patriots on the question of identity and culture. 
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The next question concerns the appropriate units for the exercise of 
democratic rights - nation states in the confederal vision, or national 
provinces in the federal solution. Here the SNP makes common cause with 
other nationalist and autonomist movements which wish boundaries to 
coincide with nationalities. The ambition is no less than the redrawing of 
the map of Europe, to reflect the national identities of its constituent 
peoples. Opposition to such an ambition can be expected to come not so 
much from Brussels as from the capitals of the multi-national Member 
States such as the UK, France and Spain. 
One ought to link this last issue with the exciting question of Eastern 
Europe and in general the expansion of the European Community to 
include the entire "common European home" which Gorbachev talks 
about. Here the SNP's position would favour such a development. 
Expansionism versus consolidation could well become a very contentious 
issue within the EC. 
The next issue concerns democratisation, and how the peoples of 
Europe, and individual Europeans, can exercise greater democratic control 
over their rulers. Some aspects -guaranteed human rights, for instance -
are theoretically easy to deal with. The powers of the European 
Parliament, and its composition (eventually bicameral, according to a 
variety of proponents) are but one aspect of this, and a problem of 
intermediate difficulty in that certain steps would find ready acceptance 
pending agreement on the really key issues of the future distribution of 
power within the Community of the future. As a general principle the SNP 
is committed to a participatory and democratic approach to the expansion 
of democratic rights. 
On a different plane are questions of economics: of free market versus 
intervention, of allocation of resources across the Community. The SNP, 
like most political parties, believes in a mixed economy but would certainly 
take an interventionist line and argue that the periphery and the 
disadvantaged areas should be assisted to reduce disparities, and to prevent 
the current merger and takeover mania from totally dominating all our 
peoples. 
What is essential in considering the future of Europe, and Scotland's 
future within it, is to establish the position on each of these scales (some of 
which are bipolar, others being more accurately described as a spectrum). 
The outcome of each of these separate but interlinked debates will settle 
the future of Europe. I believe it is both essential and inevitable that 
Scotland play a direct part in determining that future. 
Dr Allan Macartney is Staff Tutor in Politics at The Open University in 
Scotland. He was SNP candidate for North-East Scotland in the European 
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